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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Wage  subsidies  are an  important  form  of  active  labour  market
policy  in  many  countries.  This  article  draws  on general,  mostly
economic  research  literature  to discuss  the  main  types  and  dimen-
sions  and  the  pros  and  cons  of wage  subsidies,  and  their  relevance
for  targeted  schemes  for disabled  people.  An  historical  overview
of  employer-side  schemes  for disabled  people  in  Belgium  and
Flanders  illustrates  the  wide  range  of  possible  schemes.  Some
interesting  studies  of  such  schemes  from  Australia,  Sweden,  Den-
mark  and  speciﬁcally  Flanders  are  reviewed.  Crucial  aspects  of
scheme  design  such  as the  assessment  method  used  in  the eligibility
process  and  subsidy  duration  are  linked  to  the  conceptualisa-
tion of  disability  and  Organisation  of  economic  cooperation  and
development  (OECD)  recommendations  in  an  attempt  to  provide
some  guidance  on designing  schemes  which  are  tailored  to the
needs  of disabled  people  and  employers.
©  2012  Association  ALTER.  Published  by Elsevier  Masson  SAS.
All rights  reserved.
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r  é  s  u  m  é
Dans  beaucoup  de pays,  les  subventions  à l’embauche  constituent
un  instrument  important  de  la  politique  active  de  l’emploi.  En  se
basant  sur  la  littérature,  principalement  économique,  le présent
article  examine  les  types  et  les  dimensions  essentielles,  ainsi  que
les  avantages  et  les  effets  indésirables  de ce  genre  de  dispositifs,
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avec  une  attention  particulière  pour  les  subventions  destinées  aux
employeurs  des personnes  en  situation  de  handicap.  La  grande
variété des  mises  en  œuvre  est  illustrée  par l’historique  des  sys-
tèmes en  Belgique  et  en  Flandre.  Quelques  études  intéressantes
menées  en  Australie,  en  Suède,  au  Danemark  et principalement
en Flandre  sont  commentées.  Finalement,  les  éléments  clés  d’un
dispositif  optimal,  à savoir  la  méthode  d’évaluation  utilisée  pour
la  détermination  de  l’éligibilité  et la durée  de  la  subvention,  sont
examinés  à  la  lumière  de  la  conceptualisation  du  handicap  et  des
préconisations  de  l’OECD,  en  vue  d’ébaucher  un  dispositif  qui soit
adapté  aux  besoins  des  personnes  en  situation  de  handicap  et  des
employeurs.
© 2012  Association  ALTER.  Publié  par  Elsevier  Masson  SAS.  Tous
droits réservés.
After the Second World War, it took some time before Belgium introduced a comprehensive frame-
work for the employment of disabled people, but 1963 ﬁnally saw the launch of a National Programme
for the Social Rehabilitation of the Disabled ﬁnanced and operated by a new dedicated National Fund
(Samoy, 1998). The programme was primarily aimed at integration into the open labour market. It
included medical rehabilitation and active labour market policy measures (ALMPs) such as voca-
tional training, job placement, targeted wage subsidies and, as a last resort, employment in sheltered
workshops. However, during the second half of the last century sheltered work gradually became
predominant, taking up more than two thirds of total programme outlays. The basic features of the
Belgian approach have not changed radically over time, not even after disability employment policies
were devolved to decentralised entities (Regions and Communities). Although wage subsidies were
provided for in the initial legislation, they only gained momentum since the 1980s. In the Flemish
Region, their number has been increasing rapidly in recent years.
Therefore the time seems right to have a closer look at wage subsidies as a policy instrument to help
people with disabilities to ﬁnd or retain employment, all the more because little analysis is available
although a wide variety of schemes exists in Europe, the US, Canada and elsewhere (Bergeskog, 2001;
OECD, 2010; Thornton & Lunt, 1997; ZEW-IAB-IAT, 2006). Some countries, like Denmark, Sweden and
Belgium, make extensive use of this instrument, whereas in other countries, like Germany and France,
it remains rather marginal.
The main focus of this article is on the design of subsidy schemes. Before zooming in on Belgium
and Flanders (section 2), we discuss the main types and dimensions, and the pros and cons of wage
subsidies in general and their relevance for targeted schemes for disabled people (section 1). We  then
review the scarce international and Flemish research literature (section 3) and comment on key aspects
of scheme design (i.e. type of assessment used in the eligibility process and subsidy duration) in the
light of the deﬁnition of disability and recommendations of the Organisation for economic cooperation
and development (OECD) (section 4). The conclusion assesses the current Flemish scheme from this
perspective.
Wage subsidies as an active labour market measure
Types and dimensions of wage subsidies
Wage subsidies have been used since the 1930s, but they are still causing heated debate among out-
spoken proponents and detractors (e.g. Phelps, 1997; Prasch, 2002). They consist in ﬁnancial incentives
to improve the functioning of the labour market. Employer-side or ﬁrm-side subsidies aim at increas-
ing the demand for work by reducing labour costs of employing disadvantaged workers, whereas
employee-side earnings subsidies aim at increasing labour supply by improving income for low-
earnings or low-wage workers (Lee, 2005). Financial incentives for employers can take the form of
direct payments, a reduction of taxes or social security contributions, or the lowering of labour costs
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by the so-called “activation” of unemployment or disability beneﬁts, whereby workers are allowed to
keep all or part of their beneﬁts and employers may  reduce wages accordingly. These subsidies can be
applied to total employment of the ﬁrm, net increase in employment, or gross ﬂows into employment
from new hires or layoffs (Katz, 1996). Existing schemes in OECD countries present a wide variety
(Lee, 2005). In what follows, we focus on employer-side subsidies, leaving aside in-work beneﬁts such
as the British Working Tax Credit or the American Earned Income Tax Credit.
Four dimensions, which are particularly relevant to the description and comparison of schemes
for disabled people, are target population, eligible employers, and subsidy rate and duration. With
regard to target population, generic or general wage subsidies are granted for the employment of all
workers or those in low-paid jobs, whereas categorical or targeted schemes only provide subsidies
for certain speciﬁc sociodemographic categories of workers such as young labour market entrants,
the long-term unemployed, the low-skilled, older jobseekers or disabled people. This type of scheme
requires criteria to identify those belonging to the target group, and mechanisms for applying these
criteria. In the case of age, duration of unemployment or qualiﬁcation, this is quite straightforward but,
as we will see later, identifying eligible disabled people is much more complicated. Most schemes are
intended as an incentive to get people into work, and therefore target the unemployed or the inactive.
Schemes for disabled people may  also aim to prevent those who  became disabled at work from losing
their job. Reducing labour costs for this target group by means of a subsidy may  compensate for
lower productivity, thereby improving equity. Needless to say this does not imply that people with
disabilities are always less productive, whatever their impairment and work environment (see point 4).
Subsidy schemes can also differ as to eligible employers. Some are targeted exclusively at the
private (proﬁt or non-proﬁt) sector or at the public sector; others cover both sectors1.
The subsidy rate may  be set at different levels and remain unchanged for the whole subsidy period
or vary over time according to a set schedule. Subsidies may  be calculated as a ﬁxed amount (or a set
of such amounts) or as a ﬁxed rate, i.e. a percentage of eligible labour costs (or a set of such rates), in
which case the amount is often capped, for instance on the basis of minimum wages. In EU countries,
schemes for disabled workers also have to comply with EU legislation on State aid and must not exceed
75% of wage costs, including social security payments over any given period of employment. A disabled
worker “has to be recognised as disabled under national law or to have a recognised limitation resulting
from physical, mental or psychological impairment” (European Commission, 2009; Majcher-Williams
& Foecking, 2010: 20). As a rule, wage subsidies decrease over time, but, in the case of disabled people,
the subsidy may  need to be increased as the worker’s disability or health condition worsens.
Subsidies usually have a limited duration, ranging from of few weeks to a few years, the assumption
being that the subsidy period will allow the worker to prove he or she can contribute to the activities
of the business or organisation, and full productivity will have been reached by the time the subsidy
expires. By contrast, subsidies for disabled people may  often need to be extended, even repeatedly
because the work capacity has not improved. Sometimes subsidies are even granted for the duration
of the employment.
Pros and cons of wage subsidies
Targeted employer-side subsidies are advocated as a ﬂexible and efﬁcient tool to improve employ-
ment because job creation and hiring decisions are left in the hands of private ﬁrms, while costs are
partially borne by the government (Katz, 1996: 2). They are compatible with the principles of social
market economy and reward employers for showing a desired behaviour instead of forcing them into
compliance (Semlinger & Schmid, 1985: 156). In the long run, wage subsidies are said to have positive
effects on employment prospects by providing on-the-job training and work experience (Neubäumer,
2010), and to reduce employers’ uncertainty about the employability of job applicants (Jaenichen &
Gesine, 2007: 5–6).
1 In OECD terminology, the term “wage subsidy” is applied only to subsidies for private sector jobs, whereas “employment
subsidy” covers both wage subsidies and direct job creation in the public sector (100% subsidy). In what follows, the generic term
“wage subsidy” covers all subsidies granted under the Belgian and Flemish schemes to private proﬁt and non-proﬁt employers,
educational establishments and local authorities.
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However, researchers also identiﬁed a number of adverse effects on both scheme participants and
non-participants who, depending on the scheme, may  be more or less strong (Calmfors, 1994; Katz,
1996; Lee, 2005; Semlinger & Schmid, 1985). Participants may  suffer a “locking-in effect” because hav-
ing a subsidised job limits their search for a non-subsidized job (Bernhard, Jaenichen & Gesine, 2007:
5; Van Ours, 2002). Targeting of subsidies may  also be stigmatising and negatively affect employment
opportunities of the target group (Marx, 2001: 81). The main indirect macro-effects identiﬁed in the
literature are deadweight or windfall effects, substitution effects, and displacement or crowding-out
effects. Deadweight losses occur when the scheme subsidises hiring that would have occurred
anyway, providing “windfall” proﬁts to employers. Substitution effects are found when employment
gains among targeted workers come at the expense of other workers in the ﬁrm, who  are replaced
by subsidised workers. Subsidised workers themselves may  in turn be replaced by new subsidised
workers at the end of the subsidy period, in what has been called a churning effect (Burns, Edwards &
Pauw, 2010: 3). Displacement takes place when jobs created by the subsidy scheme are at the expense
of regular jobs elsewhere in the economy as a result of a distortion in competition. Researchers point to
the fact that these effects on non-participants, the relative weight of which is difﬁcult to estimate, may
signiﬁcantly lower the net employment effect of subsidies (e.g. Card, Kluve & Weber, 2009; Lee, 2005;
Zielkowski, 2009). However, the consensus seems to be that subsidies have a positive employment
effect, especially when a longer timeframe is considered (Bernhard et al., 2007; Card et al., 2009).
As far as wage subsidies for the disabled are concerned, some of these adverse effects may  be
unlikely to occur and others may, to a certain extent, be welcomed. If the subsidies do not exceed
compensation for actual loss of productivity, they merely create a level playing ﬁeld regarding working
capacity and should not create substitution effects (Österle, 1992: 50). Assuming some form of positive
action is needed to provide disabled people with job opportunities, a certain level of substitution at
the expense of jobseekers with better prospects seems acceptable (Bernhard et al., 2007). Deadweight,
however, is a real threat to programme efﬁciency. It may  be caused by undue widening of the deﬁnition
of the target group to include other categories of hard to employ individuals, or disabled people whose
work ability is not or no longer reduced. Locking-in becomes a problem when subsidies are not time-
bound and subsidised workers with a “normal” job performance are not offered regular contracts.
Finally, as for employment effects of subsidies for disabled people, they are believed to be quite modest
(Mangan, 1990a; Semlinger & Schmid, 1985).
But let us now turn to subsidy schemes in Belgium and Flanders. Because the performance of labour
market measures is inﬂuenced by the context in which they operate, we  ﬁrst provide some relevant
background information.
Wage subsidies for disabled people in Belgium and Flanders
Some background information on Belgium and Flanders
Belgium is a federal state consisting of three regions (Flemish, Walloon and Brussels-Capital Region)
and three language-based communities (Flemish, French and German-speaking Community). These
entities each have their own government since 1990, but in Flanders the Region and Community
governments have been merged. They are competent for most aspects of active labour market policies,
whereas social protection beneﬁts, quotas for federal civil servants and the general rules relating
to the employment relationship are a matter for the federal Government. Anti-discrimination is a
shared competency. Disabled people are protected against discrimination at work by both federal and
regional legislation but very few cases have been brought to court. The laws also provide for positive
(afﬁrmative) action.
The country has a well-developed social security system with universal health coverage. The
mandatory unemployment insurance does not offer overly generous beneﬁts, but is quite unique
in that beneﬁts last for the duration of unemployment and school-leavers are entitled after a “waiting
time”. The number of people on “invalidity beneﬁt” has been rising steadily over the years, albeit not
as fast as in the Netherlands and the UK (Velche, 2006) and stood at 265,000 at the end of 2009;
expenditures reached nearly 3000 million euros, or about 11,000 euros per head. Until the quickening
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pace caused alarm in recent years (+12% in two and a half years in Flanders), “activation” of recipients
never was an issue.
As regards employment and job retention for disabled people, Belgium (and especially Flanders)
always had a preference for voluntary measures, like wage subsidies, over statutory obligations
(Binamé, 2004). Contrary to countries such as the UK, France and Germany, it never placed a duty
on private businesses to employ a quota of disabled people. The rather modest quotas for the federal
and regional public administrations (3%) are not supported by sanctions, and overall compliance is low
(about 1% is reached). Belgium does not grant ofﬁcial (severely) disabled worker status, nor is there
special dismissal protection for disabled workers, which may  not be a bad thing because the employ-
ment effects of these measures are not always positive (Humer, Wuellrich & Zweimüller, 2007; Österle,
1992). The legal obligation on employers to rehabilitate employees who  become disabled while in work
does not go beyond what is covered by group insurance, and employers are entitled to wage subsidies
for these workers. There is also no obligation to retain a subsidised worker for a certain period of time
after subsidy expiry. Sheltered employment for disabled people is very important. In 2010, Flanders
spent 220 million euros on wages for about 16,000 disabled employees in sheltered workshops, or
over 13,000 euros per head.
Flanders has mainstreamed active labour market policies for the disabled into the regular public
employment service (PES) in 2006. In the rest of the country they are still operated by dedicated
institutions. The Flemish PES administers and ﬁnances the interventions, but service delivery is mainly
in the hands of private non-proﬁt organisations, such as special job placement services and special
training centres. During the training, which is mostly provided on-the-job and lasts for up to one year,
trainees continue to receive unemployment or disability beneﬁts, topped up with a small training
allowance. To reach their placement targets for disabled people, delivery organisations often resort to
wage subsidies, whether or not combined with other forms of support for disabled workers such as
grants for workplace adaptations and special equipment. In addition, hard of hearing and deaf workers
can claim workplace assistance of sign language interpreters. Both the Walloon and the Brussels-
Capital Region also grant wage subsidies and workplace adaptations grants (Samoy, 2010).
Belgium has a population of eleven million, 60% of which lives in the Flemish Region, 40% in the
Walloon Region and 10% in the Brussels-Capital Region. Based on the EU Survey on Income and Living
Conditions (SILC 2008), 14.6% of the population in employment (aged 15 to 64) suffers from long-
standing illness or health problems, whereas 10.9% is “limited” or “strongly limited” (i.e. “disabled”)
in its daily activities by longstanding illness or health problems. These ﬁgures are slightly lower than
the averages for the 27 EU Member States (EU-27), standing at 19.7% and 13.0% respectively (Eurostat,
2010: 34). The Belgian employment rate amounts to 63% among people without limitations and to
nearly 40% among disabled people, compared to the EU-27 averages of 65% and 45%. So there clearly
is room for improvement.
A short history of wage subsidy schemes for the disabled in Belgium and Flanders
Identifying the factors that shaped the wage subsidy schemes for the disabled since the early
1960s is an arduous task because little information is available. Employment for disabled people
never has been high on the public or political agenda, and there is no historical evidence of grand
policy debates, e.g. about the relative merits of wage subsidies versus quota systems or sheltered
employment (Samoy, 1998). However, it is certain that the idea of granting subsidies was generally
accepted; only the design of schemes generated some moderate discussion. Because crucial decisions
were mostly taken during scarcely documented negotiations between both sides of industry, written
records, which might shed some light on the rationale behind choices, are hard to come by. Until
2006, few regular statistics were published; even the ofﬁcial number of granted subsidies later turned
out to be unreliable. Yet the general impression is that the shift from one scheme to the next was
the outcome of a political process whereby employer organisations, trade unions, private agencies,
and organisations of disabled people kept pushing for more generous provisions and the government
complied. This year-long consensus is now under threat because the recent system review in Flanders
is mainly motivated by the government’s wish to contain costs. To prevent the reader from getting lost
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Table  1
Wage subsidy schemes for disabled people in Belgium and Flanders (1965–today).
Scheme 1 CAO-26a VIPa VOP Ia VOP II
Time frame
First year of operation 1965 1977 1998 2008 2010
Last year of operation 1995 2008 2008 2010 –
Target population
New hires x x x x x
People in work x x x x
Eligible employers
Private sector (proﬁt and non-proﬁt) x x x x x
Public  (including local authorities, education) x x
Self-employed x x
Calculation of the subsidy
Variable % actual wage costs (uncapped) (uncapped) x
Variable % actual wage costs (capped) x x
Fixed  % of minimum wage x
Variable % of minimum wage x
Duration of the subsidy
Time-bound (not renewable) x
Time-bound (renewable) x x
Unlimited in time x x
Involvement of Social Inspectorate x
a CAO: collective agreement (collectieve arbeidsovereenkomst); VIP: Flemish integration subsidy (Vlaamse inschak-
elingspremie);  VOP: Flemish support subsidy (Vlaamse ondersteuningspremie).
in the rather complicated historical overview that follows, Table 1 compares the successive schemes
on a number of crucial dimensions.
From the early 1950s until 1990
From the 1950s, disabled people in Belgium had access to a temporary wage subsidy scheme for the
hard to employ. In 1963, in the context of the above-mentioned National Programme, a ﬁrst targeted
scheme was set up. It provided for a small private sector subsidy with a maximum duration of 1 year
for disabled jobseekers who were registered with the National Fund and had been out of work for at
least 6 months. Depending on age and unemployment duration, the subsidy rate amounted to between
20% and 40% of minimum wage costs; it did not vary according to productivity. Five years later, the
rates were replaced by graduated ﬁxed amounts, which remained unchanged until the scheme was
scrapped. This ﬁrst scheme was not very successful. In the 30 years of its existence, no more than
about 3500 subsidies were granted nationwide, mainly before 1980.
Following a factory shutdown in the mid-1970s, the Social Inspectorate discovered that the
employer had been paying his disabled workers according to productivity, leaving some of them
with wages too low to be entitled to unemployment beneﬁts. To prevent future unregulated under-
payment, a collective agreement (CAO in Dutch), commonly known as “CAO-26”, was  concluded in
1975. It gave its name to a new subsidy scheme launched two years later. The agreement provides
that disabled employees in the open labour market have to earn at least the going minimum wage,
payable in part by the employer and in part out of public funds. The implementing regulation stipu-
lates that private employers taking on or retaining a registered disabled person may  claim a subsidy
of between 5% and 50% of eligible wage costs provided they pay their disabled employees the full
going wage. Subsidy granting was a two-step process: ﬁrst a National (and later Flemish) Fund ofﬁ-
cer proposed a subsidy rate based on an on-site visit, medical information about the impairment, and
comparison with relevant cases, whereupon the Social Inspectorate took the ﬁnal decision by allowing
the employer to deviate from the sector-speciﬁc minimum wage. Because regulations did not specify
the types of evidence to be used in the assessment process, and caseworkers were not provided with
standardised tools for measuring productivity loss, employers had a lot of room for bargaining. This is
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probably the reason why so many subsidy rates fell somewhere halfway between the minimum and
the maximum rate. Furthermore, the considerable regional variation, which cannot be explained by
regional differences in the severity of impairments, proves that the Social Inspectors also had a large
discretionary power. Finally, it should be noted that the disabled worker for whom the subsidy was
granted and trade unions representatives had no say in the matter.
The subsidy had a duration of up to one year but could be renewed annually following an on-site
assessment of the worker’s productivity by the Social Inspectorate. Not all employers were keen on
these visits because inspectors took the opportunity to control other aspects, e.g. work schedules. In
practice, granted subsidies were hardly ever revoked. It is therefore not surprising that employers
who had exhausted their rights to the old time-bound subsidy applied for a new “permanent” CAO-
26 subsidy. Between 1977 and 1990, all subsidies were paid out by the National Fund. At the end
of 1990 —the ﬁrst year for which regional statistics are available —there were about 3000 CAO-26
participants, of which 2000 in Flanders and 1000 in the rest of Belgium.
From 1991 until present time
In 1991, following regional devolution and subsequent institutional reform, disability employment
policy, including the administration of wage subsidy schemes, was  transferred from the National
Fund to three newly-established regional funds. In what follows, we only discuss developments in
Flanders. The Flemish Fund immediately set up a new registration process based on an assessment of
the disability by external multidisciplinary teams, which then proposed suitable support measures.
The ﬁnal decisions on entitlement to employment support were taken by dedicated independent
multidisciplinary committees.
During the ﬁrst half of the 1990s the old subsidy scheme was even less popular than before because
employers immediately applied for a CAO-26 subsidy. Eventually it was discontinued. In the mid  1990s,
new Flemish non-proﬁt “Pathways to Work” services for disabled jobseekers started to operate. They
soon felt the need for a ﬂexible wage subsidy that would be easier to integrate in the placement pro-
cess than the CAO-26 with its slow and rather employer-unfriendly eligibility and review procedures.
Hence, at the end of 1998, a new private sector subsidy was  created, the “Flemish integration sub-
sidy”, shortly called VIP. Primarily aimed at jobseekers, it was  also available to people who became
disabled while in work. This new ﬂat rate subsidy of 30% of the gross minimum wage in the relevant
business sector was explicitly meant to compensate employers for the extra costs incurred during
the initial period of adaptation to the new working environment and for possible loss of productivity.
It was not time-bound and could be transferred to a new employer in case of job change. As a con-
sequence, the initial eligibility assessments by the Flemish Fund were not subjected to review; the
subsidy acted as a kind of permanent voucher. During the period of coexistence of the CAO-26 and
VIP schemes (1998–2008), VIP employers sometimes preferred to switch to the CAO-26 despite its
temporary nature and the involvement of the Social Inspectorate, because payments were more gen-
erous: the VIP only amounted to 30% of the gross minimum wage, whereas the CAO-26 was calculated
over the total wage and could amount to 50%.
At the end of 2008, the two schemes in operation (CAO-26 and VIP) were merged into the new
“Flemish support subsidy”, shortly called VOP, in such a way  that no employer was worse off than
before. This operation coincided with an important institutional reform aimed at mainstreaming
employment policies and programmes for disabled people by passing political responsibility from
the Minister for Welfare to the Minister for Work. The administration was transferred from the Flem-
ish Fund (renamed “Flemish Agency for persons with disabilities” in 2006) to the Flemish PES (VDAB)2.
At the time of the merge, there were just over 5000 subsidies, nearly half of which were VIPs.
The VOP scheme has characteristics of both its predecessors, and its eligibility criteria draw on
those of both schemes. Access is almost automatic for some categories of disabled people, e.g. people
2 The PES (Vlaamse Dienst voor Arbeidsbemiddeling en Beroepsopleiding [VDAB]) determines eligibility for sheltered employ-
ment, but workshops are ﬁnanced by another mainstream Agency, the Flemish Subsidy Agency for Work and Social Economy
(Vlaams Subsidieagentschap voor Werk en Sociale Economie [VSAWSE]). The special Agency for people with disabilities (Vlaams
Agentschap voor Personen met een Handicap [VAPH]) stayed in charge of social care services.
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with severe physical or mental impairments, those in receipt of certain disability allowances, and
graduates from special education. For other applicants an assessment by a specialised internal or
external team is required. Final decisions on eligibility and subsidy rates are taken by the PES without
involvement of the Social Inspectorate. The subsidy amounts to 40% of eligible labour costs (capped
at twice the minimum wage) during the ﬁrst year of employment, 30% during the next three years
and 20% from the ﬁfth year onwards for an indeﬁnite period of time and without further review.
However, the employer may  apply, for an upgrade to up to 60% at any time when this is justiﬁed by
circumstances. As advocated by policy research (Vos & Bollens, 2005), VOP subsidies were also made
available for employment in education, for new hires with local authorities and for self-employment.
The greater visibility, broader eligibility base, attractive subsidy levels and lack of review of this new
scheme boosted take-up. Unfortunately, researchers’ warnings that the absence of regular reviews
would increase the risk of deadweight were not heeded3.
The launch of the VOP marked the onset of a sharp rise in the number of participants, which, by the
year 2010, had already increased by around 2000. The economic crisis and a change of government
led to an overhaul of the system after only two years of operation, with the aim of containing costs.
As from October 2010, subsidy levels in the modiﬁed scheme (which we  call VOP II for clarity’s sake)
drop to 20% already in the third year. After a stint of ﬁve years with the same employer, the subsidy is
only extended if an assessment of the worker’s productivity in the subsidised job shows a continuing
need for it. As before, the employer may  apply for an upgrade to a maximum of 60% at any time. In
both these cases, the employer has to show what the subsidy money has been used for and what costs
will be incurred in the future. To streamline this process, PES caseworkers only recently developed
a long-overdue instrument based on on-site visits and interviews with the subsidised worker and
his or her employer and colleagues. Withdrawal of the subsidy is open to appeal. Despite these new
restrictions, the number of subsidies kept rising and reached just over 8000 at the beginning of 2011.
Expenditures rose from 40.3 million euros in 2006 to 64.5 million euros in 2010. However, further
scheme modiﬁcations risk undermining employers’ conﬁdence in the continuity of support (Jansson,
2010: 15; Rendenbach, 1990: 183).
Comparison of schemes in operation between 1963 and present days
As appears from Table 1, schemes in Belgium (and later Flanders) tended to become broader and
more generous until the Flemish government stepped on the brake in 2010. The ﬁrst scheme (1963)
was also the most restrictive. Access was limited to unemployed people taking up work with a private
employer and employers were only granted a variable percentage of the minimum wage for up to
one year. The CAO-26 (1977), which coexisted with the earlier scheme until 1995, had a broader
target group since it was also available to people in work. It was also more generous as it was  based
on a percentage of actual wage costs (and not of the minimum wage) and could be renewed, even
repeatedly. However, rather tedious and long administrative procedures and the involvement of the
Social Inspectorate lessened its attractiveness to employers. The VIP (1998), which was  not time-bound
but sometimes less generous, provided a simpler alternative. The VOP (2008), which replaced both
the CAO-26 and the VIP, was unlimited in time and further broadened the scope of wage subsidies to
local authorities, education and self-employment. This trend was  only broken by a recent overhaul of
the system (VOP II) imposing restrictions on subsidy duration and speeding up the pace of subsidy
rate reduction.
Relation to other targeted wage subsidy schemes
At present, both Flanders and Belgium grant wage subsidies for a wide variety of “competing” cate-
gories of disadvantaged workers, possibly overlapping with the category of disabled people. This leads
to a complex tangle of allowed or prohibited combinations which is not always resolved in present
regulations. For instance, Flanders grants subsidies for both the over-ﬁfties and disabled people, which
3 During a meeting in preparation of the VOP I reform, the then Flemish minister for Work showed his appreciation for the
research by speaking the words of wisdom “deadweight, deadweight, there is deadweight everywhere”.
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may  be combined with one another. The present Flemish wage subsidy for disabled workers (VOP
II) may  also be combined with a federal subsidy for other target groups (low-skilled young people,
over-ﬁfties or long-term unemployed), if the worker belongs to the eligible group and is entitled to
unemployment beneﬁts. The last criterion, which does not apply at the Flemish level, is linked to the
fact that federal subsidies (ACTIVA scheme) take the form of “activation” of unemployment beneﬁts:
jobseekers who ﬁnd a job may  keep their unemployment beneﬁts for a variable period of time, while
their employer may  deduct this amount from the net wage payable.
The existing federal subsidies for disabled people were abolished in the early nineties but were
reintroduced in 2011 by including this category of jobseekers into the ACTIVA scheme. The subsidy
amounts to a maximum of 500 euros a month for two  years and is ﬁnanced through “activation” of
unemployment beneﬁts, supplemented by a dedicated fund for those not entitled to unemployment
beneﬁts.
Because information is not routinely exchanged between the federal and the Flemish PES, nothing
is known about the numbers and characteristics of Flemish disabled workers with a federal subsidy.
However, it is clear that paying multiple unrelated subsidies for the same worker or creating new
federal subsidies where regional ones already exist, will do little to improve efﬁciency. Moreover,
the proliferation of subsidies harbours the danger of habituating employers to ﬁnancial incentives
(Semlinger & Schmid, 1985: 159), blunting the competitive edge subsidies are intended to provide
(Brussig, Schwarzkopf & Gesine, 2011: 5; Rendenbach, 1990: 49). But let us now have a closer look at
available research evidence.
Research on targeted wage subsidies for disabled people
International ﬁndings on wage subsidies for disabled people
In view of the abundance of literature on wage subsidies, the paucity of research on schemes for
disabled people is rather surprising. Without pretending to be exhaustive, we  present a short overview.
One of the oldest studies we found is based on a mail survey among Australian ﬁrms (Mangan, 1990a,
1990b). It examines how altering both the subsidy level and duration inﬂuences job offers. At the
time of the survey, the Australian job-start scheme provided a generous subsidy of over 50% of the
average adult male wages. Take-up was low since ﬁve years after the launch of the scheme only some
2000 subsidies had been granted. The main ﬁnding was that job offers for people with disabilities are
not noticeably responsive to wage subsidies. Doubling the subsidy rates would only generate a 20%
increase in job offers from larger ﬁrms and a 33% increase from smaller ﬁrms. Increasing the subsidy
duration to one or two years would only bring larger ﬁrms to increase their job offers by 17 and 21%
respectively (Mangan, 1990b:  22). The corresponding results for smaller ﬁrms (32% and 37%) suggest
that they are more wage elastic in their job offers and hence more likely to be subsidy-sensitive.
Unfortunately, smaller ﬁrms were also the least informed about the scheme. The evidence suggests
that price variables may  be even less important for job offers to disabled people than they are in the
labour market in general. Among other factors likely to inﬂuence employer’s hiring decisions, Mangan
cites “uncertainty, discrimination (by themselves or in deference to other employees or customers),
or economically-rational considerations of wage productivity” (Mangan, 1990a:  211).
More recently, employers’ attitudes have been explored by the Swedish researchers Knutsson and
Persson (2001) in a telephone survey with a large random sample of private and public enterprises.
They found that, in the ﬁve years preceding the interview, only 14% of contacted employers had con-
sidered recruiting a job applicant with an occupational disability. Of those employers, 72% eventually
hired this person, in more than 60% of cases with some form of wage subsidy. The smaller the size of
the enterprises, the larger was the share of employers receiving a subsidy. Satisfaction proved high:
64% of employers stated the subsidy provided full compensation, 29% saw only partial compensation
and less than 5% saw no compensation at all. An interesting ﬁnding is that 34% of hiring employers
declared that the outcome exceeded their expectations, the main reasons being that the worker per-
formed better than expected and had a positive inﬂuence on the work of colleagues, and sick leave
was lower than expected. A replication by Statistics Sweden found that 15% of employers contacted
had considered recruiting a disabled job applicant and that almost 70% of hiring employers received a
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wage subsidy (Riksrevisionen, 2007). Satisfaction remained high (70% full compensation; 28% partial
compensation), but fewer employers (16%) claimed the subsidised employee performed better than
expected. Both studies report a lack of information among employers about available support and
responsible public services.
There is some research on the working conditions and job satisfaction of wage subsidy workers. In
Sweden, for instance, Leymann (1992) found that disabled people in subsidised jobs with non-proﬁt
organisations were ﬁve times more likely to be mobbed than their non-disabled colleagues. Using
interviews with disabled workers and people in their working environment at Uppsala University,
Eriksson (1996) discovered that, while some workers enjoyed favourable working conditions, others
felt despised and even unwanted and suffered from prejudice, social isolation and underemployment.
These negative ﬁndings were not conﬁrmed in a postal survey among workers in the non-proﬁt sector
in the Swedish city of Luleå (Blomberg, 2002). A large majority were satisﬁed with their tasks, their
working environment and contacts with colleagues. Yet another Swedish research (Hännestrand,
2004), based on interviews with a large number of people with visual or mobility impairments,
provides some evidence that the level of satisfaction with the job setting (self-employment, open
labour market with or without wage subsidy, sheltered setting) depends on the type and degree of
disability. Indeed, it was found that visually impaired workers were most satisﬁed with a regular job
and least satisﬁed with a wage subsidy job, whereas the reverse was  true for people with mobility
impairments. Although the visually impaired respondents were less satisﬁed in all settings, they
were three times more disappointed with their subsidised job than those with mobility impairments.
Their main complaint was that they felt stuck because the subsidised job was  not turned into regular
employment. According to Hännestrand, this could be explained by the fact that severely visually
impaired people only ﬁnd subsidised jobs, whereas people with less severe visual impairments are
more likely to ﬁnd regular jobs.
As far as evaluation research is concerned, the study of the Danish ﬂexjobs scheme for long-term
sick or disabled people by Datta Gupta and Larsen (2010) seems to be one of the rare econometric
analyses available (PHR, 2009). It is based on two  surveys merged with register data about labour
market status, including receipt of a disability pension. At the time of data collection (2001), the
scheme granted a wage subsidy for the duration of tenure amounting to one third, half or two thirds
of wage costs (capped at the negotiated minimum wage) according to the reduction in work capacity.
Compared to regular employment, ﬂexjobs offer reduced working hours, adapted working conditions,
and/or restricted job demands. Since the introduction of the scheme, the number of beneﬁciaries rose
from 6700 in 1999 to 40,600 in 2006. For the examined age group (18 to 49 years), a substantial
positive employment effect was found, but no discernable effect on outﬂow to disability pensions.
Results seem to suggest that the scheme provided jobs for people with less severe disabilities, whereas
those with more severe health problems were granted a disability pension. The authors argue that, in
settings characterised by universal health insurance and little employment protection, like Denmark,
schemes such as ﬂexjobs can strongly increase employment among the relatively healthy disabled
with a reduced work capacity, provided adverse scheme effects are minimised and disability pension
or other exit schemes are redesigned (Datta Gupta & Larsen, 2010: 26–27)4.
A rather bleak picture emerges from a qualitative evaluation of the same scheme based on in-depth
interviews with employees, employers, social workers and other stakeholders by Hohnen (2001), cited
in PHR (2009: 88). Although employees were happy to be in work, it was  found that they often held low-
paid and low-skilled odd jobs for which they were sometimes overqualiﬁed. Interviewees reported
negative consequences on their self-esteem and relationship with colleagues, loss of entitlement to
unemployment beneﬁts and conﬂicts over pay rate. The author concludes that scheme participants
rather held the status of social clients than of employees and were in danger of being marginalised
within employment.
4 A previous analysis (Datta Gupta & Larsen, 2008) found much stronger negative effects, which were reported in PHR (2009)
and  OECD (2010: 160 “enormous substitution and deadweight loss”).
104 E. Samoy, L. Waterplas / ALTER, European Journal of Disability Research 6 (2012) 94–109
Flemish ﬁndings on wage subsidies for disabled people
Research in Belgium and Flanders is also scant. In the nearly 50 years of their existence, the subsidy
schemes have only been the object of three studies, the ﬁrst of which took place in 1985 (Molleman,
1985). It focused on the main scheme at the time (CAO-26) and was based on face-to-face interviews
with all employers in the Flemish province of Limburg receiving subsidies. The researcher presented a
detailed picture of the employers and the employees participating in the scheme, which was  conﬁrmed
by later studies and ofﬁcial statistics. Two important ﬁndings were that one employer in three declared
that the disabled employee would not have been recruited or retained without wage subsidy, whereas
nearly three employers out of 10 declared that the impairment of the subsidised worker did not cause
any productivity loss at the time of the interview, either because he or she never had a reduced capacity
for work or because initial problems had been overcome in the meantime. The results suggest that
the employment effect of the subsidy is dependent on the nature of the disability: for workers with
an intellectual impairment 66% of employers declared that withdrawal of the subsidy would lead
to dismissal, compared to 36% for workers with a physical impairment and 21% for workers with
a sensory impairment. Despite the fact that CAO-26 subsidies were supposedly tailored to the work
capacity and were reviewed annually, the researchers found that no subsidy had ever been withdrawn
and rate reductions were extremely rare.
It took 20 years before a second survey was carried out by Vos and Bollens (2005),  using telephone
interviews with a stratiﬁed random sample of Flemish employers and face-to-face interviews with a
separate random sample of disabled workers. Additionally, the researchers conducted oral interviews
with medical professionals and Flemish Fund ofﬁcers involved in the eligibility process, and analysed
administrative data. The research focused on the two subsidy schemes coexisting at the time, the CAO-
26, which was temporary only on paper and the unlimited VIP. Of the 4818 subsidies in operation,
60% were CAO subsidies.
The study discusses the implementation of the schemes, and the quality of subsidised jobs (control
over work situation, workplace adaptation, etc.), and provides an assessment of employment effects.
It was found that most subsidies were granted to small or medium-sized businesses with less than 50
employees. The majority of employees were men  aged between 24 and 45 doing manual work, but
jobs ranged from kitchen hand to director of an organisation. On average, the disabled respondents
claimed to be satisﬁed to very satisﬁed with the different aspects of their job. A surprising ﬁnding
is that 20% were not aware of the fact that their employer received a subsidy, which shows how
little workers were involved in the eligibility process. Most employers claimed the granted subsidy
rate was adequate. When asked to rank ﬁve aspects of a subsidy according to importance, employers
found coverage of total productivity loss to be most important and certainty about the amount of the
subsidy prior to recruitment next important. As far as possible deadweight effects are concerned, Vos
and Bollens (2005) found that nearly half of the employers claimed the disabled worker would not
have been recruited or retained without subsidy. However, two  out of ﬁve CAO-26 employers and
three out of ﬁve VIP employers said they were pleased with the money, but felt no real need for it. On
the other hand, half of the interviewed disabled workers stated the subsidy contributed to their job
security.
Based on their ﬁndings, the researchers advised to merge both schemes into a single two-step
scheme. During a ﬁrst, time-bound stage employers would be granted a ﬁxed percentage of wage
costs as compensation for the costs of job introduction and initial training, and for possible loss of
productivity. After a thorough assessment, in a second stage compensation would only pertain to a
proven persisting reduction in work capacity. To better target the subsidy to real needs and improve
the transparency of the subsidy process — a real black box according to Vos and Bollens — they also
advised to impose an accounting obligation on employers instead of simply paying without asking
questions.
Recently a third Flemish study (Roosens et al., 2010) examined the quality of VOP jobs and workers’
awareness of the destination of the subsidy money. It was  based on a postal survey with a stratiﬁed
random sample of VOP I employees (some 75% converted CAOs or VIPs) and workplace interviews with
a limited number among them. Working conditions were assessed using the measurement tool of the
regular working conditions survey (Eurofound, 2007). This allowed for comparison not only with the
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general population but also with a group of survey respondents claiming to suffer from longstanding
health problems and/or disabilities. It was found that working conditions in subsidised jobs were
similar to those of the general population, but better than those of people with longstanding health
problems and/or disabilities. According to Roosens et al. (2010),  this is linked to the fact that there are
more older workers and more people who became disabled at work among the survey population of
self-declared “disabled” individuals, whereas the VOP population comprises more young people who
were already disabled when they started looking for a job. The inﬂuence of type of disability could not
be established owing to lack of information for the survey population. The better quality of the VOP
jobs may  also be explained by careful placement by the “pathway to work” services. As was the case
in the study by Vos and Bollens (2005),  some respondents only found out their employer received a
wage subsidy when contacted to participate in the survey. The most striking ﬁnding, however, was
that the majority either had no idea to what use the money was being put or declared that it was not
or minimally used to support their employment. It is, therefore, not surprising that the involvement
of VOP employees in the allocation of the wage subsidy at the workplace is low. Nearly four out of ﬁve
have no say at all, some 10% have a limited involvement, another 10% have substantial involvement
and 1% decide autonomously what the money is used for. Half of the respondents were also unable to
say how termination of the subsidy would affect their tenure. Of the other half, most felt that their job
would be in danger, whereas only one third were conﬁdent there would be no negative consequences.
Summary of research ﬁndings
The international studies reviewed show that employers and disabled workers are generally satis-
ﬁed with wage subsidies. The picture is less positive for schemes only offering special low-skilled and
low-paid jobs, and for non-proﬁt organisations sometimes providing dead-end jobs. Flemish research
shows high levels of employer and worker satisfaction in both the proﬁt and non-proﬁt sector and
ﬁnds no evidence that disabled people feel “stuck” in subsidised employment or that subsidised jobs
are unviable or conﬁned to the lower end of the job market. Different studies point to the important
role of small ﬁrms as a job market for disabled people. Flemish research did not conﬁrm the ﬁnding
that they often are unaware of available support, but found a quite shocking lack of information and
involvement of the disabled workers themselves. The efﬁciency of wage subsidy schemes is greatly
threatened by potential deadweight loss. The Danish ﬂexjobs study and the three Flemish studies show
that schemes for disabled people are no exception. In view of the suggestion by Marx (2001: 74) that
evaluations based on interviews with employers might underestimate the deadweight loss, as a result
of selection distortion and opportunistic responses, the ﬁgures in the Flemish studies are probably
even underestimated. Scheme design, which we now turn to, should help minimising this adverse
effect.
Design of wage subsidy schemes for people with disabilities
Current leading conceptualisations of disability provide some guidance as to how wage subsidy
schemes for disabled people should be designed. According to the UN Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (2008),  disabilities are “long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory
impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder [their] full and effective participa-
tion in society on an equal basis with others”. Based on the International Classiﬁcation of Functioning,
Disability and Health (ICF, WHO, 2001), the Flemish Community deﬁnes an occupational disability as
“every longstanding and important problem to participate in working life, due to the interaction of
mental, psychological, physical or sensory impairments, limitations in the performance of activities
and personal or external factors” (our translation)5.
These deﬁnitions are contextual in the sense that they take into account characteristics of both
the individual and the environment, and deﬁne disability as the result of the interplay between them.
Until some 40 years, ago thinking about disability was dominated by the medical model, which viewed
5 Decree on the Flemish Public Employment and Vocational Training Service, 2008, Belgian Ofﬁcial Journal 27.1.2009, p. 5170.
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disability as an attribute of the individual caused by a disease, a trauma or another health condition,
and requiring interventions directed at the disabled individual. This view was  challenged in the 1970s
by the social model viewing disability as a socially created problem requiring interventions in the
physical and social environment to remove disabling barriers. The biopsychosocial model synthesises
the medical and the social model in that it recognises that biological, psychological and social factors
all play a signiﬁcant role in human functioning in the context of disease or illness. Interventions should
therefore be directed at both the individual and the environment (Smart, 2009; Stiker, 2007).
Wage subsidies as deﬁned here consist of an amount of money paid to a disabled person’s employer,
but it can be argued that the use the money is put to usually changes the environment rather than the
disabled individual. As a means of overcoming employers’ hesitations or misgivings about a prospec-
tive worker’s productivity, absenteeism, dependability or interaction with others, a wage subsidy is an
intervention in the “attitudinal environment”. As a ﬁnancial compensation for reduced productivity
it also brings about an environmental change because expectations as to output quantity or quality
are lowered. Using the subsidy as compensation for the working time colleagues spend to support
a disabled coworker would also be an intervention in the worker’s environment, whereas spending
it on additional training for the disabled worker would be a capacity improvement and hence an
intervention directed at the disabled individual.
The relationship between the medical and the biopsychosocial models of disability on the one hand,
and scheme design on the other hand, is reﬂected in the two main methods to determine eligibility for
a wage subsidy, leading to two  types of schemes (Österle, 1992: 48). According to the ﬁrst method, eli-
gibility decisions are based exclusively on information about the nature, the degree and the (expected)
duration of the applicant’s impairments, without looking at job tasks to be performed. The underlying
assumption is that, from a certain level of severity, all impairments will have a negative impact in
most work situations. Under this ﬁrst approach, employers would, for instance, always be entitled to
a wage subsidy if the worker is blind, or deaf or has a severe mental impairment.
A second approach links individual information about impairments to the characteristics of a spe-
ciﬁc work situation — the job the individual is about to take up or already holds — and assesses the
impact of the impairments on performance in this speciﬁc context. Depending on the tasks to be
performed and the working environment, there may  be little or even no impact and, therefore, no
reason to grant a wage subsidy. The consequences of impairments may  also be mitigated or elimi-
nated by interventions in the work environment (e.g. adaptations to the workplace, equipment and
tools or working arrangements, or personal support). These may be covered by dedicated grants or
by the wage subsidy. Because this method bases decisions on information about speciﬁc job tasks in
a speciﬁc work situation, it is sometimes termed “concrete assessment” as opposed to the “abstract
assessment” used in the ﬁrst approach. It can be argued that linking impairments to a speciﬁc work
environment does most justice to the biopsychosocial model. However, abstract assessments are not
entirely in conﬂict with this model provided the impairments giving automatic entitlement to a wage
subsidy are those that would cause problems in most work environments if no workplace adaptations
were made.
Because they may  want to use subsidy entitlement as a “carrot” to convince prospective employers,
placement ofﬁcers often need to decide whether a disabled jobseeker is eligible for a subsidy before
this individual has found a job and hence without information about a speciﬁc job situation. In this
case, abstract assessment is the only method available. Conversely, when a subsidy is granted for a
former trainee starting work with the same employer or to promote job retention, the total situation
is known, and a concrete assessment becomes possible. In principle, the Belgian CAO-26 scheme was
based on concrete assessments, whereas the Flemish VIP scheme relied entirely on abstract assess-
ments. Both methods are used in the current VOP II process. The PES bases eligibility decisions for
disabled jobseekers on an abstract assessment using a list of impairments, special school background,
available information about employability of people with non-listed impairments, or an external mul-
tidisciplinary assessment. For subsidy upgrades or reviews after the ﬁrst term of ﬁve years, a concrete
assessment has to be performed. However, it seems quite illogical that applications for workers who
have been recruited and sometimes have been employed for years without a subsidy are not sub-
jected to a concrete assessment but are treated in the same way as new applications. This unfortunate
“oversight” in the legislation might increase deadweight losses since employers are entitled to a wage
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subsidy for all employees eligible on the basis of listed disabilities or a special schooling background,
even if their productivity is not reduced at all.
Besides type of assessment, subsidy duration is another important dimension of scheme design.
Time-bound targeted subsidies are based on the assumption that the subsidised worker will be fully
productive by the time the subsidy expires. This is also what is hoped for in the case of disabled
workers, but often it will take much more time before they achieve a “normal” output. Periods of up-
to-standards job performance may  alternate with bad spells (e.g. for people with psychiatric disorders)
and some disabled workers —for instance, people with a mental impairment, may  never reach the level
of their non-disabled counterparts. It is obvious that a uniform time-limited subsidy scheme cannot
cover all these situations (Österle, 1992: 49). For disabled workers, extension subject to review is often
necessary.
According to the OECD, the most efﬁcient schemes seem to be those that are “well targeted to the
needs of the employer and the employee and ﬂexible over time and in relation to the person’s work
capacity (which might be changing over time) so as to allow the employer to test a worker and the
PES to lower or cut-off the subsidy quickly when the worker’s productivity has increased” (OECD,
2010: 136). Such tailor-made schemes are in line with the current view of disability not as a stable
individual characteristic but as the result of the interaction between impairments, which may  evolve,
and an environment, which may  also change. Subsidies must therefore be adaptable to the situation.
Apart from the basic requirements in the OECD blueprint, preventing deadweight and containing
costs calls for careful setting of scheme parameters such as the criteria for eligibility and for entitlement
to an extension or upgrade of the subsidy, the subsidy level and maximum amount, the graduation
of the subsidy and its pace, accountability and reporting requirements and links with beneﬁt systems
and other targeted subsidy schemes. It is impossible to provide more detailed guidelines on scheme
design because, just as subsidies need to be tailored to speciﬁc circumstances, subsidy schemes should
be adapted to the national or regional context, taking into consideration institutional settings, labour
market conditions and, especially, other active labour market measures.
Conclusion
The history of the Belgian and Flemish wage subsidy schemes could be seen as a long experi-
mentation leading up to the current system, which has many but certainly not all of the required
characteristics. It is tailored to the needs of employers wanting certainty at the point of hiring and
reassurance that the subsidy will be adapted to changes in job performance. It also meets the needs
of disabled people requiring positive action at the point of entry into the labour market and some
protection against disability-related dismissal. For placement agencies, the scheme is a ﬂexible and
user-friendly tool, which, as yet, does not put too heavy a burden on the PES administration and bud-
get. A downside is that it is impossible to “lower or cut-off the subsidy quickly when the worker’s
productivity has increased”, as required by the OECD, because a ﬁrst concrete assessment of produc-
tivity is only conducted after ﬁve years. Although the scheme has a wide scope, not all disabled people
are eligible. The maximum subsidy rate (60%) corresponds to a level of work capacity under which
people are generally thought to be unﬁt for regular work and may  be referred to sheltered employ-
ment. The minimum rate (20%) excludes those whose productivity loss is so minor that they should be
able to compete with non-disabled workers, if need be with special provisions, such as special training
or workplace adaptations. Therefore wage subsidies occupy a central and vital place in the range of
measures to promote the employment of disabled people in Flanders.
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